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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I place Mary Leng’s version of mathematical instrumentalism within the con-
text of the debate in mathematical realism/anti-realism as well as within the context of the 
platonism/nominalism debate. I maintain that although her position is able to show how the 
conjunction of Quinean naturalism and confirmational holism does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that mathematical objects must necessarily exist for they are indispensable 
in our best scientific theories; her usage of both theses still leads to platonism. Such is the 
case for her characterization of scientific theories as akin to a set-theory that accommodates 
fictitious objects and statements within it is untenable due to the dependence of fictions 
on a realist ontology. 
Keywords: fictionalism, mathematical instrumentalism, indispensability argument, Mary 
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RESUMO
Neste artigo, situo a versão de Mary Leng do instrumentalismo matemático no contexto 
do debate do realismo/antirrealismo matemático, bem como no contexto do debate do 
platonismo/nominalismo. Sustento que, embora sua posição seja capaz de mostrar como a 
conjunção do naturalismo quineano e do holismo confirmatório não leva necessariamente 
à conclusão de que os objetos matemáticos devem necessariamente existir, pois são indis-
pensáveis em nossas melhores teorias científicas, seu uso de ambas as teses ainda leva ao 
platonismo. Esse é o caso de sua caracterização das teorias científicas, semelhante a uma 
teoria dos conjuntos que acomoda objetos e declarações fictícias dentro dela, sendo insus-
tentável devido à dependência de ficções em relação a uma ontologia realista.
Palavras-chave: ficcionalismo, instrumentalismo matemático, argumento da indispensabili-
dade, Mary Leng, platonismo, nominalismo.
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Introduction
Traditionally, philosophy of mathematics is charact erized by the distinction between the 
foundational and anti-foundational positions in the field. Foundational positions which include 
formalism, intuitionism, and logicism maintain that (1) mathematics has a foundation and (2) 
mathematical development can be assessed using mathematical logic. Anti-foundational posi-
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tions, on the other hand, deny (1) and (2) as they maintain 
that mathematics and mathematical development can only 
be understood through a detailed analysis of mathematical 
pract ice. Contemporary arguments in philosophy of mathe-
matics, however, deviate from this methodological and the-
matic distinction as they use logical tools in their assessment 
of how our conception of mathematical objects, statements, 
and knowledge is affected by mathematical pract ices. For this 
reason, there is a general agreement amongst the pract itioners 
in contemporary philosophy of mathematics that the disci-
pline has moved beyond the foundational/anti-foundational 
debates (Mancuso, 2008; Colyvan, 2012).
In line with this, philosophy of mathematics, as it is un-
derstood in this paper, includes arguments that emphasize 
the use of logical tools in the analysis of mathematical prac-
tice and methodology as well as their relation to the forma-
tion and justification of our most expedient scientific theo-
ries. Describing philosophy of mathematics this way allows 
a narrower yet more inclusive charact erization of the field 
which continues to conform to the broader charact erization 
of the discipline as the interpretation and illumination of 
the place of mathematics in the overall intellectual enter-
prise (Shapiro, 2005).
With this in mind, this paper delves into the contem-
porary debate in philosophy of mathematics between math-
ematical realism (MR) and anti-realism (MAR) about the 
ontology of mathematical objects. It addresses the tenability 
of Mary Leng’s mathematical instrumentalism (MI) which 
posits that although adopting a naturalistic ontology shows 
the indisp ensable utility of mathematical objects in scientif-
ic theories, neither pure mathematics nor empirical science 
provide epistemic justification for the existence of mathe-
matical objects. Hence, one should reject the existence of 
mathematical objects.
On the debate between 
mathematical realism/anti-realism
As of the moment, there are several asp ects which char-
act erize the debate between MR and MAR. An overview 
of the different positions in the debate shows the following. 
First, the distinction between MR and MAR is due to the 
differences of how they address the independence and exis-
tence dimensions of abstract objects which in turn define the 
independence, existence, and truth themes underlying the 
varieties of MR and MAR. MR and MAR, in this sense, can 
be understood in terms of their contrasting views about the 
role of human cognition in either the discovery or creation of 
mathematical objects and facts. Whereas the various forms of 
MR argue for the mind-independence of mathematical enti-
ties and/or facts, the different kinds of MAR argue otherwise. 
Michael Devitt (2008) refers to this as the independence and 
existence dimensions of the broader debate between all types 
of realisms and anti-realisms in philosophy. Although char-
act erizing the debate through these metaphysical theses ex-
cludes both the epistemic and semantic theses, which some 
philosophers consider to be lacking in the standard charac-
terization of the debate (e.g. Wright, 1992), there is a gener-
al consensus that the agreement or disagreement over these 
theses supplies the most useful charact erization of the debate 
in philosophy. Such is the case since they are the overarch-
ing themes in the various forms of realisms and anti-realisms 
across the different domains in the discipline (Brock and 
Mares, 2007). 
Second, contemporary debates between MR and MAR 
are divided into debates about ontological MR∕MAR and 
truth-value MR∕MAR. Shapiro (2005) maintains that the ad-
aptation of the prevailing model-theoretic semantics in phi-
losophy leads to either MR∕MAR in ontology or MR∕MAR 
in truth-value. The distinction between ontological and 
truth-value MR∕MAR, in this sense, is a byproduct of the 
shift from the syntact ic to the semantic view of theories. 
Although both the syntact ic and semantic view of the-
ories focus on a theory’s structure, they differ in their char-
act erization of a theory’s structure and the structure’s rela-
tion to the world. The syntact ic or sentential view of theories 
maintains that theories are deductively closed axiom systems 
which can be formalized using first-order logic. For example, 
in the syntact ic view, a scientific theory T is the combination 
of its axioms AX and correspondence rules or coordinating 
definitions C. In comparison, the semantic or model-theoret-
ic view of theories distinguishes between a theory’s structure 
M and its linguistic formulation AX. M here is composed of 
a non-empty set U which is the universe or domain of the 
structure, an indexed set of operations O that is applicable to 
U, and a non-empty indexed set of relations R on U. In the 
model-theoretic view, M logically satisfies AX if M provides 
an interpretation where AX is true. M thereby functions as a 
truth-maker. In addition, M also represents a structure which 
is assumed to possess structural similarities to the world. In 
the semantic view, a model thereby realizes two functions. 
First, it interprets a theory’s axioms and second, it represents 
the world thru a theory’s model(s). In comparison to the 
syntact ic view, the semantic view is supposedly free from 
the baggage of showing the correspondence of propositions, 
statements, or sentences to the world since it is mainly con-
cerned with showing the structural similarities between a 
model and the world. Adopting the semantic view of theories, 
in this context, allows the distinction between ontological 
and truth-value MR∕MAR since it allows one to determine 
the objectivity of a mathematical statement by positing that 
there is a model which gives it a true interpretation. In this 
scenario, the truth of AX is separated from empirical matters 
since the truth of AX is utterly dependent on the operations 
and relations allowed between the members of U. This paves 
the way for a view that maintains the objectivity of mathe-
matical truth without necessarily presupposing the mind and 
language independent existence of the mathematical objects 
quantified in mathematical statements. 
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Within this context, those who adopt the difference be-
tween ontological and truth-value MR∕MAR maintain that 
their dissimilarity lies in the former’s focus on the quantified 
objects in a linguistic framework in comparison to the latter’s 
focus on the truth-value of the well-formed meaningful sen-
tences in a linguistic framework. Note, however, that even if 
the focus of both ontological and truth-value MR∕MAR dif-
fers, a position’s explanation for its commitments in the for-
mer directly affect its stance in the latter and vice versa. For 
example, he who adopts MR in truth-value may argue for the 
objectivity of mathematical statements due to the objectivi-
ty of logical consequence (Leng, 2010). He merely needs to 
emphasize the following. First, mathematical statements are 
products of logical reasoning and second, products of logical 
reasoning are objective due to the objectivity of logic. By high-
lighting these, one who adopts MR in truth-value argues for 
the objectivity of mathematical truths by maintaining that 
mathematical truths are logical consequences of the axioms 
of the mathematical theories from which they were derived. 
A problem, however, arises if one considers that logical con-
sequence is explained through logical possibility. For instance, 
we maintain that given the axioms of a mathematical theory 
T, Q is a logical consequence of P1, P2…Pn if and only if it is 
not logically possible for Q to be false if P1, P2…Pn are true. 
Logical possibility, however, entails commitment to sets, a 
mathematical object. This is so because the best explanation 
for the logical possibility of Q states that Q is true since there 
is a set-theoretic model which interprets Q as true. From 
this argument, initially it seems that he who adopts MR in 
truth-value must also adopt MR in ontology.
I have noted this example to show my disagreement 
with Kreisel’s dictum that “the point is not the existence of 
mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematical 
truth” (Kreisel, 1958, p. 138). In the example above, it is evi-
dent that shifting the focus on the objectivity of mathemat-
ical truth still leads to questions related to the existence of 
mathematical objects. In the example, it led to questions re-
lated to the existence of sets. It is for this reason that I have 
maintained that a position’s explanations for its commit-
ments in MR∕MAR in truth-value directly affect its com-
mitments in MR∕MAR in ontology. A satisfactory account 
of mathematical knowledge and its applications thereby re-
quires a coherent metaphysical account for both the truths 
and objects in mathematics. 
From all these, it seems that, at first glance, one may 
adopt a seemingly intuitive position that MR∕MAR in ontol-
ogy leads to MR∕MAR in truth-value and vice versa. Howev-
er, such is not the case. Without delving into the merits of the 
following positions, a survey of the different positions in the 
debate shows that, as it is understood by most of the partici-
pants in the debate, ontological MR does not imply truth-val-
ue MR. In a similar manner, ontological MAR does not imply 
truth-value MAR. For instance, positions that deny the mind 
and/or language independence of mathematical objects and 
hence the literal interpretation of mathematical statements 
either maintain that mathematical statements are true (e.g. 
Hellman’s modal structuralism), false (e.g. Field’s fictional-
ism), or do not have a fixed truth-value (e.g. Dummett’s in-
tuitionism). Likewise, positions that affirm the existence of 
mathematical objects and hence the literal interpretation of 
mathematical statements either maintain that mathematical 
statements are true (e.g. Godel’s logicism) or false (e.g. Ten-
nant’s intuitionism).
Let us now move on to the next two charact eristics of the 
debate. Third, contemporary debates in ontological MR∕MAR 
begin by either justifying or debunking the adoption of a Quin-
ean naturalist methodology in determining the existence of 
mathematical objects. Lastly, MR/MAR in ontology address 
the issues surrounding the existence of mathematical objects 
by initially providing their views about epistemic justification 
in science. I will expound on both of these points in the de-
velopment of the paper’s argument. For now, suffice it to state 
that regardless of the availability of other methodologies to 
both sides, it is generally considered that Quinean naturalism 
best demonstrates the relationship between the issues related 
to the ontological existence of mathematical statements, the 
truth-value of mathematical statements, and the applicability 
of mathematics outside the discipline.
Given the varieties of both MR and MAR, this paper 
focuses on the nominalist and platonist positions in the de-
bate in MR∕MAR in ontology. The most prominent positions 
on the side of MR include the different versions of platonism, 
physicalism, and psychologism. The most well-known po-
sitions on the side of MAR, on the other hand, include the 
various forms of formalism, implicationism, and nominalism. 
This paper focuses on the nominalist and platonist argu-
ments, however, since they provide the most viable versions 
of the third and fourth charact eristics of the debate which I 
mentioned earlier. Recall that the third charact eristic of the 
debate highlights how arguments between MR/MAR in 
ontology either justify or debunk the adoption of a Quinean 
naturalist methodology as they either prove or disprove the 
existence of mathematical entities. Remember as well that 
the fourth charact eristic of the debate stated above highlights 
how the justification or refutation of the use of Quinean nat-
uralism provided by those who adopt either MR∕MAR in on-
tology leads those who participate in the debate to initially 
supply their views about epistemic justification in science. 
Both of these points define one of the primary interests of 
this paper, which is the implications of the methodology one 
adopts in one’s argument for either the existence or non-exis-
tence of mathematical entities. 
An overview of the arguments given by nominalists and 
platonists show that the demarcation between both groups 
lies in the former’s objections against the latter’s justification 
for the existence of abstract objects. Platonists argue for the 
existence of abstract a whereas nominalists remain skeptical, if 
not adamant, about the existence of non-spatial, non-tempo-
ral, causally impassive and inact ive objects (Burgess and Ros-
en, 1997). A loose formulation of their arguments will show 
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that platonists adopt a Quinean naturalist methodology in 
order to use the indisp ensability argument (IA) to determine 
the existence of mathematical objects. In fact, platonists’argu-
ments for the third and fourth charact eristics of the debate 
mentioned earlier are dependent on their development of 
their IAs. This has led to a variety of IAs.
What is important to note in relation to the variety of 
IAs is how they emphasize the role of mathematical explana-
tions in proving the existence of mathematical objects. The 
IA, in its traditional formulation, is charact erized by its em-
phasis on the quantification of mathematical objects in em-
pirical theories which is a result of its adherence to holism. 
By adopting a holistic view of theories, it presupposes the ex-
istence of a linguistic framework that determines the inferen-
tial connections between the statements within it. In general, 
holism argues that an utterance can only be meaningful with-
in the context of the linguistic framework where it derives its 
content. As a result, a broad interpretation of holism shows 
that a theory’s confirmation leads to the equal confirmation 
of its non-eliminable claims, including mathematical state-
ments. Most of the versions of the traditional formulation of 
the IA follow this route, as can be seen in Michael Resnik’s 
presentation of the traditional IA below:
(1) Mathematics is an indispensable part of 
our best scientific theories.
(2) Mathematics shares whatever confirma-
tion accrues to the theories using it (Quin-
ean holism).
(3) So mathematics shares the confirmation 
accruing to our best scientific theories.
(4) We are committed to the truth of our 
best scientific theories (naturalism).
(5) So we are also committed to the truth of 
the mathematics they contain (Resnik, 2003, 
p. 232).
In general, the positions that generate problems with this 
view can be determined in line with the platonist-nominalist 
distinction in ontological realism. Platonists, for instance, in 
favoring IA, may still take issue with (2) and (3). Nominalists, 
on the other hand, may pose problems for (1) to (5) with the 
exception of (4).
In most cases, concerns against the traditional formu-
lation of IA are traced to its holistic framework. Recent con-
figurations of IA, like Resnik’s, thereby exclude (2) and (3) in 
the formulation of the argument. Colyvan’s IA, for instance, 
highlights the role of indisp ensability as it posits: 
(1) We ought to have ontological commit-
ment to all and only those entities that are 
indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(2) Mathematical entities are indispensable 
to our best scientific theories. 
(3) We ought to have ontological commit-
ment to mathematical entities (Colyvan, 
2001, p. 11).
Colyvan charact erizes indisp ensability via the charac-
teristics of disp ensability, wherein he considers a theory dis-
pensable if and only if:
(1) There exists a modification of the theory 
in question resulting in a second theory with 
exactly the same observational consequences 
as the first, in which the entity in question is 
neither mentioned nor predicted.
(2) The second theory must be preferable 
to the first (Colyvan, 2001, p. 11).
He thereby argues for the indisp ensability of mathemat-
ics in scientific theories by appealing to its preferability over 
other theories on the grounds of its simplicity, our familiar-
ity with its principles, the wider scope of its application, its 
fecundity, and its test ability. The existence of mathematical 
objects, in this sense, is determined through IBE.
Another recent argument which uses IBE is Alan Baker’s 
enhanced indisp ensability argument (EIA). EIA can be seen as 
the byproduct of the agreement between platonists and nom-
inalists that the indisp ensability of mathematics in scientific 
theories ought to account for the explanatory role of mathe-
matics in science (Baker, 2009; Colyvan, 2002). It assumes:
(1) We ought rationally to believe in the exis-
tence of any entity that plays an indispensable 
explanatory role in our best scientific theories.
(2) Mathematical objects play an indispens-
able explanatory role in science.
(3) Hence, we ought rationally to believe 
the existence of mathematical objects (Bak-
er, 2009, p. 613).
In comparison to Colyvan’s IA, EIA utilizes IBE while 
emphasizing the inseparability of mathematics from empiri-
cal science by arguing for its representational and explanatory 
role in successful scientific theories.
To support their assumptions, both Colyvan and Baker 
formulated case studies that apply their IAs to scientific theo-
ries. Baker argues for the indisp ensability of a number theoretic 
theorem in the explanation of a purely physical phenomenon, 
the life-cycle of the North-American cicadas. In conjunction 
with the premises of EIA, Baker includes the following in his 
analysis of the North American cicada’s life-span:
(1) Having a life-cycle period that minimizes 
intersection with other (nearby/lower) periods 
is evolutionary advantageous. (biological law)
(2) Prime periods minimize intersection 
(compared to non-prime periods). (number 
theoretic theorem)
(3) Hence organisms with periodic life cycles 
are likely to evolve periods that are prime. 
(‘mixed’ biological/mathematical law)
(4) Cicadas in ecosystem-type E are limited 
by biological constraints to periods from 14 
to 18 years. (ecological constraint)
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(5) Hence cicadas in ecosystem-type E 
are likely to evolve 17-year periods (Baker, 
2009, p. 614).
Baker maintains that (2) is an essential component in 
the explanation of the cicada’s life-span since it provides ex-
planatory power by showing how primeness is a necessary 
component in explaining the evolution of the Magicacicadas. 
In addition, he considers it a genuine mathematical explana-
tion since it is an application of a number theoretic theorem 
to a physical phenomenon which needs explanation. In rela-
tion to the existence of mathematical entities, Baker main-
tains that since (2) provides genuine explanatory power to a 
scientific theory which shows its indisp ensability in the the-
ory, it also proves, using IBE, the existence of prime numbers.
In comparison to Baker’s case study, Colyvan and Lyon 
(2008) inquire on (1) the role of Hale’s honeycomb theorem 
in explaining the hexagonal division of beehives and (2) the 
role of the Hamiltonian formulation in explaining the He-
non-Heiles system. In (1), along with Baker, they also dis-
tinguish between the scientific component, in this case the 
evolutionary component, and the mathematical component 
behind the phenomena as they claim:
(T)he biological part of the explanation is 
that those bees which minimise the amount 
of wax they use to build their combs tend 
to be selected over bees that waste energy 
by building with excessive amounts of wax. 
The mathematical part of the explanation 
then comes from what is known as the hon-
eycomb conjecture: a hexagonal grid rep-
resents the best way to divide a surface into 
regions of equal area with the least total 
perimeter (Colyvan and Lyon, 2008, p. 230).
Given Colyvan’s charact erization of disp ensable theo-
ries, it is assumed that by IBE the explanation for the hexag-
onal division of beehives supplied by the combination of the 
explanations from Darwin’s theory of evolution and Hale’s 
honeycomb theorem proves the existence of mathematical 
objects. Such is the case since the honeycomb theorem sup-
plies the best mathematical explanation for the phenome-
na. In the case of (2), on the other hand, Colyvan and Lyon 
(2008) demonstrate that a reformulation of the theory leads 
to the loss of its explanatory power since it excludes the expla-
nation of phase-space and the Poincare map. 
Within this context, in line with the third and fourth 
charact eristics of the MR/MAR debate mentioned earlier, 
several charact eristics of the contemporary formulations of 
IA can be derived from Colyvan’s (2001; 2008) and Baker’s 
(2009) versions, these being: (1) their separation of IA from 
holism, (2) their use of IBE, and (3) their emphasis on the 
representational and explanatory role of mathematics in suc-
cessful empirical theories. From these charact eristics, either 
(2) or (3) or both are the targets of the counter-arguments 
against these positions. Counter-arguments against both posi-
tions that question (2) reject the applicability of IBE to math-
ematical posits. Those who question (3), on the other hand, 
desire a clear demarcation of the representational role from 
the explanatory role of mathematics in successful scientific 
theories. Finally, arguments against both (2) and (3) present 
either a combination of the reasons for the rejection of (2) or 
(3) or target their reliance on scientific realism.
Other criticisms of these contemporary versions of IA 
point out that the scientific explanation of a physical phe-
nomenon merely provides its mathematical representation. 
It is indeed the case that in the formalization of a scientific 
theory, one adopts a particular mathematical model. Hence, 
criticisms that take this form argue that contemporary for-
mulations of IA need to explain the relationship between 
mathematical models and scientific reality before indicating 
that there is the need to discuss the role of mathematical ex-
planations in successful empirical theories. Shapiro states this 
succinctly as he claims:
Clearly, a mathematical structure, descrip-
tion, model, or theory cannot serve as an 
explanation of a non-mathematical event 
without some account of the relationship 
between mathematics per se and scientif-
ic reality. Lacking such an account, how can 
mathematical/scientific explanations suc-
ceed in removing any obscurity – especially 
if new, more troubling obscurities are intro-
duced? (Shapiro, 2005, p. 217).
An example of a persp ective which addresses the prob-
lems of est ablishing the relationship of the theory and its 
model can be seen in Christopher Pincock’s mapping ac-
count of mathematical application which maintains that for 
a mathematical model to represent a scientific theory it must 
indicate “(i) what purely mathematical entity or structure is 
in question, (ii) how the parts of the mathematics are to be 
physically interpreted and (iii) what sort of structural relation 
must obtain between the interpreted mathematical structure 
and the target system for the claim or model to be accurate” 
(Pincock, 2010, p. 3). In Pincock’s (2010) view, the main goal 
of applied mathematics is representational. Criticisms of this 
view emphasize that it delimits the application of mathemat-
ics to its capacity to provide mathematical models of success-
ful scientific theories. The role of applied mathematics, how-
ever, is not limited to this as it also aids in the formulation of 
new predictions as well as in the explanation of phenomena. 
Regardless of the variety of IAs formulated by platonists 
nowadays and the criticisms forwarded against them, these 
IAs remain similar as they use the premises of scientific real-
ism to argue for (1) the mind and language independence as 
well as (2) the literal interpretation of the parts of mathemat-
ical discourse used in scientific discourse. It is for this reason 
that platonists maintain that (1) the existence of mathemat-
ical objects can be derived from the literal truth of scientific 
theories and (2) there are good reasons to assume the literal 
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truth of most scientific theories. Nominalists, on the other 
hand, in their adoption of a Quinean naturalist methodol-
ogy also utilize SR. However, in contrast to platonists, they 
argue for (1) the mind and/or language dependence and/or 
(2) the non-literal interpretation of the parts of mathemati-
cal discourse used in scientific discourse. It is for this reason 
that nominalists maintain that (1) mathematical objects are 
incorporated in our best scientific theories only for their in-
strumental value and (2) there are good reasons to assume 
the empirical adequacy of scientific theories as opposed to 
their literal truth.
An analysis of Mary Leng’s 
mathematical fictionalism
In the case of Leng’s MI, she adopts a nominalist position 
as she argues for the non-existence of mathematical objects 
by arguing for the coherence of MI over scientific realism 
(SR) and constructive empiricism (CE). Her MI is primarily 
a refutation of MR which she equates with both platonism 
and the combination of SR and IA. She maintains:
(S)ince scientific realism so understood by 
itself implies that we ought to believe in all 
the objects indispensably posited to exist 
by the statements we use to express our 
best scientific theories, scientific realism 
combined with the indispensability of math-
ematics automatically implies mathematical 
realism […] I will use the label mathemat-
ical realism interchangeably with the label 
“platonism,” where platonism is the view 
that we ought to believe in mathematical 
objects understood as abstracta […] If we 
take (an) entirely negative characterization 
of abstracta, then any version of mathemat-
ical realism that denied the abstractness of 
mathematical objects would have to argue 
that mathematical objects are spatially or 
temporally located, or that they are causally 
efficacious […] I take it to be safe to assume 
that belief in mathematical objects amounts 
to belief in abstracta negatively character-
ized (Leng, 2010, p. 9-10).
Initially, what is important to recognize in Leng’s char-
act erization of MR is how she highlights the connection be-
tween SR and MR. By showing that SR combined with IA 
leads to MR, she shows that questions regarding the existence 
of mathematical objects are not only of interest in philosophy 
of mathematics but also in philosophy of science. This is so 
since if one maintains that our most expedient scientific the-
ories are true or approximately true, then one is committed 
not only to the truth of the mathematical statements in those 
theories but also to the existence of the mathematical objects 
posited in those theories. It is for this reason that Leng argues 
for the coherence of MI over SR and CE. Another asp ect of 
Leng’s MI which is important to consider is how it responds 
to one of the concerns mentioned in the previous section, that 
being the need to supply an account of how mathematics is 
able to represent scientific reality. 
Within this context, Leng uses Quine-Putnam’s indis-
pensability argument (QPI) as the focal point of her refuta-
tion of MR. She presents QPI in the following form:
P1 (Naturalism): We should look to science, 
and in particular to the statements that are 
considered best confirmed according to our 
ordinary scientific standards, to discover 
what we ought to believe.
P2 (Confirmational Holism): The confirma-
tion our theories receive extends to all their 
statements equally.
P3 (Indispensability): Statements whose 
truth would require the existence of mathe-
matical objects are indispensable in formu-
lating our best confirmed scientific theories.
C (Mathematical Realism): We ought to be-
lieve that there are mathematical objects 
(Leng, 2010, p. 7).
She also provides the main assumptions of Bas van 
Fraassen’s CE, these being:
(1)  One ought to adopt the mathematically stated the-
oretical world-pictures provided by science.
(2)  Scientific theories are mathematically stated theo-
retical world-pictures since they “represent empirical 
phenomena as embeddable in certain abstract (math-
ematical) structures” wherein these abstract mathe-
matical structures are “describable only up to struc-
tural isomorphism” (Van Fraassen, 2010, p. 238).
(3)  Scientific theories are not necessarily true, they are 
only empirically adequate wherein a scientific theo-
ry is true if it “has a model which is a faithful replica, 
in all detail, of our world” (Van Fraassen, 1980, p. 68-
69) and a scientific theory is empirically adequate 
if it has some “surface (data) models of phenomena 
(that) fit properly with or into the (theory’s) theoret-
ical models” (Van Fraassen, 2010, p. 305). 
(4)  Within scientific theories, a hypothesis has an ob-
jective truth-value not because it supplies a literal 
description of the world but because it is within a 
theory which fits an adequate representation of a 
phenomenon. 
(5)  Within scientific theories, only hypotheses about 
observable objects and phenomena, objects and 
phenomena which can be observed in the circum-
stances contextually implied within scientific theo-
ries, have objective truth-values.
In relation to CE’s position regarding the existence of 
mathematical objects, it subscribes to a nominalist position 
as it remains agnostic about the existence of mathematical 
objects. In the case of QPI, Leng maintains P1 and P3 while 
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denying P2. In the case of CE, although Leng concurs with (1) 
and (2), she denies (3), (4), and (5). 
Before proceeding to the basic assumptions of Leng’s 
MI to initiate the comparison of MI with QPI and CE, it 
is important to note that amongst the assumptions of CE 
mentioned above, I derived (2), (3), and (4) from Van 
Fraassen’s SE. In this regard, within her works, Leng only 
explicitly accepts (1). In the same manner, she only explic-
itly denies (3) and (5) based on Van Fraassen’s initial de-
scription of empirical adequacy in his CE. As one will note, 
however, based on the assumptions of Leng’s MI presented 
below, she can be understood as accepting (2) and denying 
(3) and (4) of CE as well. 
Within this context, an overview of her argument for 
MI, given her acceptance of some of the assumptions of QPI 
and CE, allows me to formulate her overall argument in the 
following way: 
(1)  We should look to science, and in particular to the 
statements that are considered best confirmed ac-
cording to our ordinary scientific standards, to dis-
cover what we ought to believe.
(2)  A reflective understanding of science and scientific 
pract ice requires us to adopt the norms of science, 
which in the case of ontological scruples, is the norm 
of parsimony that delimits the entities assumed to 
exist within theories to those which must exist by 
necessity.
(3)  The confirmation our scientific theories receive 
shows the instrumental value of adopting a math-
ematical model for our scientific theories based on 
a prop-oriented theoretical framework that dis-
tinguishes, based on its principles of generation, 
between statements adopted for their utility as op-
posed to statements adopted for their literal truth.
(4)  The confirmation our mathematically stated hy-
potheses receive only confirms their status as theo-
retical fictions.
(5)  Mathematical statements whose fictional truth 
would require the existence of mathematical objects 
are indisp ensable in formulating our best confirmed 
scientific theories.
C:  A reflective understanding of science provides rea-
sonable grounds to reject the existence of mathemat-
ical objects.
It is important to note that I focused on her agreement 
with some of the assumptions of QPI and CE in presenting 
her MI since they provide what Leng considers to be the most 
viable arguments that lead to either MR or MAR. In the case 
of QPI, it depicts the combination of naturalism and IA, the 
trademark of MR. In the case of CE, Leng shows that there 
is no strict disjunction between SR and CE. She argues that 
to deny CE does not entail adherence to SR in the same way 
that to adopt naturalism does not entail subscription to SR. 
Leng’s position, in this sense, can be understood, to a limit-
ed extent, as a midway position between MR and MAR. She 
considers her view to be subscribed under a limited-scientific 
anti-realism as she argues for the existence of some unobserv-
able physical objects due to her acceptance of the application 
of inference to the best explanation (IBE) for both observable 
and unobservable physical objects but not for abstract objects 
such as mathematical entities.
Given these assumptions, an initial analysis of Leng’s ar-
gument shows that her MI espouses the following:
 Ontological Assumption (OA): There exists a mind-in-
dependent world which is composed of non-mathemat-
ical objects, these being observable and unobservable 
physical objects. 
 Semantic Assumption (SA): Only the nominalistic con-
tent, the non-mathematical content, of a theory possess-
es an objective truth-value.
 Epistemic Assumption (EA): Scientific theories with 
great predictive and explanatory power provide nomi-
nalistically adequate representations of reality wherein 
a theory T provides a nominalistically adequate repre-
sentation of reality if and only if its nominalistic content 
corresponds with the physical world.
Along with these, Leng’s (2005; 2010) MI allows us to 
maintain that her views reflect the following attitudes to-
wards mathematics:
 Anti-hermeneuticism: Mathematical theories are not 
truth-normed for these theories merely provide the log-
ical consequences of adopting our charact erizations of 
mathematical concepts regardless of mathematicians’ 
different attitudes towards mathematical pract ice.
 Anti-revisionism: Mathematical pract ice should not be 
revised regardless of the results of philosophical criticisms.
 Doublethink: It is appropriate to susp end belief in the 
existence of mathematical objects in both mathematical 
and scientific pract ice as long as one recognizes that phi-
losophy provides justified reasons to reject the existence 
of mathematical objects.
Given these assumptions, the appeal of addressing Leng’s 
MI lies in its presentation of a new persp ective not only for 
understanding the relationship of both pure and applied 
mathematics to empirical science but also for addressing the 
issues surrounding the debate between ontological MR and 
MAR. In addition, her Mathematics and Reality also gives the 
most comprehensive discussion of MI in the existing litera-
ture (Leng, 2010). Leng fills a lacuna in the existing literature 
about ontological realism as she supplies a fictionalist’s stance 
for both pure mathematics and science. In the process, she 
shows that one can adopt a naturalist methodology and argue 
for the indisp ensability of mathematics in scientific theories 
even if one subscribes to nominalism. As a result, she supplies 
those who adhere to MR, merely due to their disagreement 
with CE, an alternative stance for developing their arguments 
for the non-existence of mathematical objects.
In spite of these, Leng’s MI seems incoherent for the 
following reasons. First, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween a naturalist methodology and a fictionalist method-
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ology in so far as a naturalistic methodology cannot be sepa-
rated from a view which presumes that the goal of scientific 
inquiry is truth, and not merely empirical adequacy. Second, 
it is necessary to distinguish between the representational 
as opposed to the explanatory role of mathematics in our 
most expedient scientific theories in order to address MI’s 
presumption that there is a clear demarcation that can be 
made between the fictional as opposed to the literal con-
tent of these theories. Finally, it is also necessary to clarify 
the background assumptions of fictions understood as met-
aphors in order to clarify MI’s presumption that fictions do 
not require a realist ontology.
The need to distinguish between a naturalist as opposed 
to a fictionalist methodology seems to be implied within 
Leng’s development of MI itself as she maintains that her MI 
is “profoundly un-Quinean” as it opts for the revival of the 
Carnapian sense of the analytic-synthetic distinction (Leng, 
2010, p. 260). Though arguably Quinean naturalism still re-
tains some asp ects of Carnap’s conventionalism without the 
two dogmas of empiricism, it is still important to flesh out 
how her MI’s interpretation of naturalism requires a distinc-
tion between a naturalist as opposed to a fictionalist method-
ology in order to reconcile what seems to be an incoherence 
in terms of her MI’s adoption of naturalism and her MI’s 
views about scientific inquiry.
Before elaborating on the second and third reasons for 
the incoherence of Leng’s MI mentioned above, it is import-
ant to trace how they are made possible by her adoption of 
Kendall Walton’s claim that fictional discourse is compara-
ble to a game of pretence or make-believe. In line with her 
presentation of Walton’s theory of make-believe, Leng (2010) 
forwards the following claims: 
(1)  A discourse is fictional so long as there is a prescrip-
tion to imagine that it is true regardless of whether 
it is true or false.
(2)  Prescriptions of what can be imagined within a fic-
tional discourse are determined by the rules of gen-
eration of that discourse which in turn determine 
the claims that are allowed and disallowed within 
that fictional discourse.
(3)  A fictional discourse can be prop oriented wherein 
a game of make-believe or pretence is prop oriented 
if the primary interest of participating in the dis-
course is to describe and supply information about 
objects independent of the discourse.
Applying these assumptions to our most expedient sci-
entific theories, Leng maintains that scientific discourse is a 
prop-oriented fictional discourse following the rules of gener-
ation of the game of set theory with non-mathematical urele-
ments. She states:
We need […] to tell some story about how 
mathematical objects relate to non-math-
ematical objects, so as to allow us to view 
our mathematically stated scientific laws as 
hypotheses concerning what is fictional in 
this story […] We have such a story, in set 
theory with non-mathematical objects as 
urelements […] (In this story), facts about 
non-mathematical objects can generate the 
fictionality of utterances in the context of 
set theory with urelements […] (H)ow things 
are with the non-mathematical props will 
make fictional some utterances in the con-
text of this make-believe. And similarly, by 
hypothesizing that a given utterance is fic-
tional in this make-believe, we can indirect-
ly represent a hypothesis concerning how 
things are with the non-mathematical props 
(Leng, 2010, p. 176-178).
In this case, adopting Walton’s notion of prop-oriented 
make-believe allows Leng’s MI to do the following. First, dis-
tinguish between the fictional as opposed to the literal con-
tent of a theory. Second, distinguish between the instrumen-
tal as opposed to the descriptive content of a theory. Finally, 
argue for the nominalistic adequacy of our most expedient 
scientific theories. 
Within Leng’s MI, instead of claiming the truth of our 
most expedient scientific theories, one is only warranted in 
maintaining that an expedient scientific theory is nominalis-
tically adequate. Such is the case since it is only the non-math-
ematical content of the scientific theory which represents 
the conditions in the world. In other words, it is only the 
non-mathematical content of our most expedient scientif-
ic theories which can be understood as literally true since 
its mathematical content is merely true within the fiction 
of set theory with non-mathematical urelements. Adopting 
the game of set theory with non-mathematical urelements 
thereby allows Leng’s MI to further distinguish between the 
descriptive as opposed to the instrumental parts of a scien-
tific theory. It is only the non-mathematical content of the 
scientific theory which has a descriptive function, whereas 
the mathematical content of the scientific theory only has an 
instrumental function. It is instrumental in so far as it allows 
one to indirectly determine, by virtue of how one charact er-
izes the mathematical content of a theory, which objects and 
statements within the scientific theory count as mathemati-
cal and non-mathematical. 
Leng’s MI, however, falls short in terms of its meth-
od for distinguishing between the fictional as opposed to 
the literal content of a scientific theory in so far as she 
presumes that there is a fixed interpretation that will 
distinguish between the mathematical content and the 
non-mathematical content within a given scientific theo-
ry. An observation of scientific practice, however, shows 
us that such is not the case (e.g. kinetic theory of heat). In 
the initial stages of a scientific theory’s formulation, there 
is no fixed demarcation between its mathematical and 
non-mathematical content. This is so not because one can-
not access the non-mathematical content of a theory, but 
because what we classify as the non-mathematical content 
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of a scientific theory is dependent on our current under-
standing of natural phenomena. 
As a result, it seems that setting the dividing line between 
what is literal as opposed to fictional in a scientific theory can 
only be done by MI retrosp ectively. That is, when a scientific 
theory has already successfully predicted and explained a par-
ticular phenomenon. To solve this, it is important to clarify 
how Leng’s MI distinguishes between the representational as 
opposed to the explanatory role of mathematics in scientific 
theories. Such is the case since, at best, her claim that scientific 
theories ought to be understood within the game of set theory 
with urelements only shows how a mathematical game may 
represent or describe the distinction between the mathemat-
ical and non-mathematical objects within a scientific theory. 
It seems that it cannot supply an adequate reason for how 
the inclusion of a mathematical explanation within a scien-
tific theory supplies that theory with greater predictive and 
explanatory power.
This brings to light another problem with Leng’s MI 
which is dependent on her assumption that there is an equiv-
alence between fiction and metaphor. Leng follows Yablo as 
she adopts Yablo’s charact erization of a metaphor as “an ut-
terance that represents its objects as being like so: the way that 
they need to be to make the utterance pretence-worthy in a 
game that it itself suggests” (Yablo, 1998, p. 170). Her adop-
tion of the equivalence between fiction and metaphor is also 
apparent as she claims:
On the account we have been considering, 
by uttering a sentence S that appears to 
concern the relation between real, concrete, 
objects and the objects of some ideal mod-
el, a theorist may succeed in representing 
some metaphorical content of S to be true. 
And if so, the value of uttering the sentence 
S might be indirectly to assert not that S is 
true, but rather, to assert S’s metaphorical 
content, that is, that the real worldly ‘props’ 
in the game are such as to make the sen-
tence S fictional (Leng, 2010, p. 170-171).
In this context, since her MI maintains that mathe-
matical statements are akin to metaphors, her MI is able to 
maintain the distinctions between instrumental as opposed 
to descriptive and fictional as opposed to literal statements 
mentioned above. Rest ating scientific stories in the game of 
set theory with urelements thereby allows her MI to high-
light facts that hold outside the game. In other words, it al-
lows her MI to maintain that pretending as if mathematical 
objects share the same ontological status of non-mathemati-
cal objects allows one to elicit facts about the non-mathemat-
ical objects included in the game. In this case, mathematical 
objects and statements are indisp ensable to the formulation 
of our most expedient scientific theories since they allow us 
to infer facts about non-mathematical objects. To this extent, 
her association of fictions with metaphors serves as a back-
drop for her MI’s indisp ensability claim. 
However, as I see it, anchoring her indisp ensability 
claim on the comparison of fictions with metaphors leads 
to a problem mainly because fictions understood as meta-
phors require a realist background ontology. To begin with, 
her MI’s presupposition that there is a well-drawn distinction 
between the fictional as opposed to the literal claims within 
a scientific theory already presupposes that even if scientif-
ic theories are understood within a game which already hy-
pothesizes, as a result of its rules of generation, the fictional 
claims within the game, it is still the scientific theory’s pre-
diction and explanation of phenomena which allows one to 
infer that a set of claims are fictional as opposed to another 
set of claims that supply literally true descriptions of scientif-
ic reality. The game, however, proceeds as scientists pretend 
that mathematical objects share the same ontological status 
of the non-mathematical objects within the game. A realist 
background ontology, in this case, is required in comparing 
fictions with metaphors since one must already presuppose 
that the properties attributed to non-mathematical objects 
can also be attributed to mathematical objects. Such a pre-
sumption, however, is problematic since, to begin with, in the 
state wherein a scientific theory has yet to successfully predict 
and explain a phenomenon, one is unclear about the proper-
ties that both the mathematical and non-mathematical ob-
jects may share. One cannot appeal to the usual charact eriza-
tion of abstract a here since Leng maintains that her MI is also 
committed to the existence of unobservable physical objects. 
Conclusion
In this paper, I provided (1) an overview of the debate 
in MR/MAR while (2) at the same time showing the val-
ue of Leng’s MI. However, (3) I have also pointed out that 
regardless of whether Leng shows that mathematical state-
ments in our best scientific theories can be treated as akin to 
fictions, the primary problem with her account is that fictions 
require a realist ontology. Hence, (4) even if she charact erizes 
the game of make-believe as occurring within a particular set 
theory with urelements, it would also require that the com-
ponents of this set theory and its primary elements should be 
understood in the context of a realist ontology. This leads her 
nominalist view to be privy again to platonist criticisms. Re-
gardless, (5) Leng’s MI is still valuable since it seems to steer 
us to a variant of a constructive empiricist view contrary to 
her claim. That is, (6) if set theory is understood as a game 
of make-believe in order to explain away the discrepancy in 
the existence of idealizations in our best scientific theories, 
we may claim that the game of set theory actually provides us 
with a framework that has similarities to the actual external 
world that our scientific theories aim to represent. (7) This 
opens up further discussion on how the debate between MR/
MAR can be connected to the ongoing debates in philosophy 
of mind regarding how we should charact erize consciousness 
and to what extent consciousness allows us to access the ex-
ternal world. 
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 20(3):268-277, sep/dec 2019
Fictionalism and mathematical explanations
277
 References
BAKER, A. 2005. Are There Genuine Mathematical Explana-
tions of Physical Phenomena? Mind, 114:223-238.
BAKER, A. 2009. Mathematical Explanation in Science. British 
Journal of Philosophy of Science, 60:611-633. 
BROCK, S.; MARES, E. 2007. Realism and Anti-realism. Trowbri-
dge, Acumen.
BURGESS, J.; ROSEN, G. 1997. A Subject with No Object: 
Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
COLYVAN, M. 2001. The Indispensability of Mathematics. Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press.
COLYVAN, M. 2002. Mathematics and Aesthetic Considera-
tions in Science. Mind, 111:69-74.
COLYVAN, M. 2012. Introduction to Philosophy of Mathemati-
cs. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
COLYVAN, M.; LYON, A. 2008. The Explanatory Power of Pha-
se Spaces. Philosophia Mathematica, 16:227-243.
DEVITT, M. 2008. Realism/Anti-Realism. In: S. PSILLOS; M. 
CURD (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of 
Science. London, Routledge, p. 224-235.
KREISEL, G. 1958. Review of Wittgenstein’s Remark on the 
Foundations of Mathematics. British Journal of the Philoso-
phy of Science, 9:135-158.  
LENG, M.  2005. Revolutionary Fictionalism: A Call to Arms. 
Philosophia Mathematica, 13:277-293.
LENG, M. 2010 Mathematics and Reality. Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
MANCUSO, P. 2008. Introduction. In: P. MANCUSO (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, p. 1-21. 
PINCOCK, C. 2010. On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics 
in Empirical Science. British Journal of the Philosophy of 
Science, 61(1):1-25.
RESNIK, M. 2003. Holistic Mathematics. In: M. SCHIRN (ed.), 
The Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, p. 227-248.
SHAPIRO, S. 2005. Philosophy of Mathematics and Its Logic: 
Introduction. In: S. SHAPIRO (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, p. 3-27.
VAN FRAASSEN, B. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press.
VAN FRAASSEN, B. 2010 Scientific Representation: Paradoxes 
of Perspective. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
WRIGHT, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Harvard, Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
YABLO, S. 1998. Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? Procee-
dings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 
72:229-262.
Submitted on March 05, 2019. 
Accepted on September 20, 2019.
